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ABSTRACT:
Third-party litigation against public accountants has
increased significantly during the past two decades. In response
to this litigation explosion, the accounting profession has
proposed reforms in the legislative and judicial aspects of the
~ legal system. This paper presents an objective view of the
litigation crisis facing the public accounting profession and
some possible solutions.
The research included personal interviews, in addition to a
review of current articles and the transcript of the Bily v.
Arthur Young & Co. court verdict. Text book research provided
the base for all other information.
The product liability theory, the expectation gap,
accountants' common law liability to third parties, and theories
regarding this liability are explained. Public accounting's
Statement of Position and high risk audits are discussed.
Potential solutions are then presented.
Reform for both the accountants and the legal system are




Accountants' Common Law Liability
to Third Parties: Another Look
Third-party litigation against public accountants has
increased significantly during the past two decades. In response
to this litigation explosion, the accounting profession has
proposed reforms in the legislative and judicial aspects of the
legal system. The purpose of this paper is twofold: to present
an objective view of the litigation crisis facing the public
accounting profession; and to discuss possible solutions.
The methodology utilized to gather information will be
described in the next section. The surge of litigation, its
impact on the accounting profession, and potential solutions to
~ the legal liability crisis will also be discussed in depth. The
conclusions of the author are presented in the final section of
the paper.
Method
A review of the literature was conducted to gain a basic
understanding of the legal liability issues affecting the public
accounting profession. An interview questionnaire designed to
elicit the opinions of legal experts regarding accountants' legal
liability was developed (The questionnaire is presented in
Appendix A.). Care was taken to address issues relevant to both
-
accountants and third-party users of financial statements.
I
The three legal experts included in the study were Professor
Harold Wright, Professor Samuel Oddi, and Attorney Howard Stone.
Professor Harold Wright is an Associate Dean in the College of
Business at Northern Illinois University. Professor Wright
directs the Executive MBA Program and teaches the business law
sections of the Certified Public Accountant (CPA) review course.
Samuel Oddi is a Professor in Northern Illinois University's
College of Law. Professor Oddi specializes in professional
liability issues. Mr. Howard Stone, CPA, Certified Fraud
Examiner, is an attorney at Stone, McGuire & Benjamin. Mr Stone
was the Co-chair of the Illinois CPA Foundation's Professional
Liability Conference.
Professors Wright and Oddi were interviewed in person. Mr.
Stone's interview was conducted in writing through the mail.
The Litigation Explosion
"Tne number of lawsuits filed annually in federal courts
jumped from 86,000 to 239,000 between 1962 and 1982," and "more
suits have been filed against accountants in the past 15 years
(1972-1987) than in the entire previous history of the
profession" (Mednick: 119). Several theories attempting to
explain this escalation of litigation have emerged. Some experts
theorize that accountants are finally being held accountable for
a product they promised the public they could deliver--accurate
information about a company's financial position. Others,
including Professor Harry Wright, believe Americans in general
- want to be protected. They do not want to take responsibility
I
when something "bad" happens and use the legal process to blame
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other parties. In this case, third parties view accountants as
their shield against losses from bad investments. These parties
believe that an unqualified opinion on a company's financial
statements means the company is financially sound. Thus, should
a company receiving a clean opinion subsequently declare
bankruptcy, there must have been an audit failure.
Another possible cause for increasing litigation is the
amount of damages being awarded. In fact, "Justices Sandra Day
O'Connor and John Paul Stevens have observed that punitive-damage
awards are skyrocketing" (White: 2). It is very probable these
recent large settlements and jury awards have encouraged
questionable suits. Plaintiffs are hoping the threat of a
possible large judgement will encourage a settlement.
r
Product Liability Theory
Traditionally, American society has chosen to protect the
naive buyer from the unscrupulous seller. Manufacturers were
considered more capable of protecting themselves through
insurance than the consumer and, therefore, are held to a higher
liability standard. The same "theory of strict product liability
has been expanded by some courts to the area of professional
liability" (Minow: 72).
I
The New Hampshire Supreme Court compared accountants and
manufacturers to justify the broad, new liability: 'An
accountant, like the manufacturer under products liability
law, is in the best position to regulate the effects of his
conduct by controlling the degree of care exercised during
the performance of his professional duty. The accountant,
through the fee structure, can pass along to his clients the
3
cost of insuring against financial loss sustained by them
through reliance upon his negligent misstatement of fact'"
(Minow: 77).
However, manufacturers and other opponents of product
liability theory argue:
What if in our zeal to punish the reckless and the criminal
and the negligent we drive too many companies into
bankruptcy? Or what if the costs of such awards render
American goods uncompetitive in international markets? How
many jobs will be lost when companies export jobs to a less
litigious environment? (White: 2).
Accountants' arguments against product liability theory include




Third-party users of audited financial statements generally
expect a product that is much different from what the auditor
delivers. The accounting profession is partly to blame for this
gap between expectation and reality. Professor Harry Wright
believes the presentation of the financial statements themselves
leads people to believe the numbers are "hard and cold" when, in
fact, many account balances contain estimations that "are not as
neat as they appear." Relevant information may be disclosed in
footnote, but the face of the statements leave the misperception
of complete accuracy.
Furthermore, after the Securities Act of 1933 and the
.
I
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, the profession did little to
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clarify for the public the degree of responsibility assumed,
leading to these three expectations:
(1) Auditors perform the audit with technical competence,
integrity, independence, and objectivity; (2) auditors
search for and detect material misstatements, whether
intentional or unintentional; and (3) auditors prevent the
issuance of misleading financial statements (Kell: 87).
Additionally, auditors are now expected to address the going
concern issue. Essentially the auditor must assess the
likelihood of a business failure occurring within twelve months
of the balance sheet date.
In an attempt to narrow the expectation gap, the American
Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA) issued nine new
Statements on Auditing Standards (SASs). The standards have
~
helped the auditor define what is expected of her. The abstract
nature of the issues and the precise wording of the standards,
however, make it difficult for the less-sophisticated financial
statement user to fully understand the auditor's responsibility.
This holds equally true for judges and juries. Twelve years ago
Victor Earle, general counsel of Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co.,
described with precision this confusion:
-
The misconceptions in the public mind are at least five
fold: first, as to scope -- that auditors make a 100 percent
examination of the company's records, which can be depended
upon to uncover all errors or misconduct; second, as to
evaluation -- that auditors pass on the wisdom and legality
of a company's multitudinous business decisions; third, as
.to precision -- that the numbers set forth in a company's
audited financial statements are immutable absolutes;
fourth, as to reducibility -- that the audited results of a
company's operations for a year can be synthesized into a
single number; and fifth, as to approval -- that byI
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expressing an opinion on a company's financial statement,
the auditors 'certify' its health and attractiveness for
investment purposes (Minow: 77).
The public's expectations clearly differ from the product
accountants deliver. The public's expectations and the inability
of accountants to meet these expectations has placed the
credibility and reputation of the accounting profession in
jeopardy.
Third-Party Liability Defined
Should a third party sue the CPA of audited financial
statements, the basic elements that must be proved are "duty of
care, the CPA's breach of that duty, damage suffered by the third
party, and a sufficiently close causal connection between the
r
CPA's breach and the third party's damage" (Miller, GAAS:
112.02). The duty of care element has three standards: ordinary
negligence, gross negligence or recklessness, and fraud. Anyone
of these standards, or any combination thereof, may be used in an
action against the CPA.
Ordinary negligence occurs when the CPA fails to perform an
audit with due professional care and is relatively easy to prove.
In some cases, a bad decision or an error in judgment may be
interpreted as ordinary negligence. For example, an auditor may
decide, based on her judgement of the situation, not to perform a
particular audit procedure. If this procedure would have
-
I
uncovered fraudulent activities on the part of the client, third-
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party investors might argue that the auditor was negligent for
not performing that procedure.
Gross negligence is defined as a serious occurrence of
negligence. Recklessness, although similar to gross negligence,
involves cases in which reasonable steps were not taken to assure
reliability of the financial statements being audited.
Recklessness is sometimes called constructive fraud. Fraud, the
third standard for the duty of care element, "occurs when a CPA
issues a report on financial statements knowing that the
financial statements are false" (Miller, GAAS: 112.04).
If an accountant is found liable, she may be required to
bear 100 percent of the damages even if she is only 20 percent at
fault. This concept of joint and several liability protects
~ plaintiffs against losses by allowing them to collect from any
defendant. The entire judgement can be collected form one
defendant, leaving per-share issues for the co-defendants to sort
out. The "deep pocket" accountants are usually the easiest to
collect from. Although the accountants have a right to
indemnification from the other defendants, co-defendants are
often unable to pay their share. Therefore, the accountant is
exposed to risk far beyond the amount of audit fees.
Theories on Third-Party Liability
To date, there are four legal theories of accountants legal
. liability to third parties for ordinary negligence. (Note:
I
auditors are generally liable to all third parties for gross
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negligence or fraud.) The first view, which is nearly extinct,
makes it very difficult for third parties to bring suit against
an accountant. This view maintains that an accountant has no
liability without privity. Privity occurs only under a
contractual relationship. The second view is the same except
that it broadens privity to its practical equivalent. Three
prerequisites now required to prove practical equivalency of
privity are:
(1) the auditor was aware that the financial statements
were to be used for a 'particular purpose,' (2) the auditor
knew that, in furtherance of this 'particular purpose,' it
was intended that the plaintiff rely on the financial
statements; and (3) the auditor engaged in some conduct,
linking the auditor to the plaintiff, and showing the
auditor's understanding that the plaintiff would rely on the
financial statements (Miller, GAAS: 112.05).
r
Expanded liability beyond the privity relationship was originally
announced in Ultramares v. Touche, Niven & Co. by New York's
highest court in 1931. However, because of these three
requirements and the undefined meaning of "particular purpose,"
third parties still have difficulty pursuing cases in states
adopting this view.
A third approach (the Restatement approach) expands the
CPA's liability for ordinary negligence to include a limited
group of third parties (foreseen third parties) for whose benefit
the CPA's work is supplied. The first case promulgating the
Restatement approach was Rusch Factors, Inc. v. Levin (1968) in
I
Rhode Island's Federal District Court.
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The fourth and final view, emerged in 1983 when the New
Jersey court in H. Rosenblum, Inc. v. Alder held "that an auditor
who commits ordinary negligence will be held liable to third
parties whose reliance was reasonably foreseeable, unless
consideration of public policy makes this result inappropriate"
(Miller, GAAS: 112.08). Wisconsin issued a similar decision in
1983. Under the reasonably foreseeable view, the actually
foreseen and the limited classes do not have to be proved. "The
plaintiff need only demonstrate that the reliance on the CPA was
reasonably foreseeable by the CPA at the time of the audit, that
public policy would be served by holding the CPA liable, and that
the CPA committed ordinary negligence, on which the plaintiff
relied to his or her detriment" (Miller, GAAS: 112.08). These
(' public policy issues are decided on a case-by-case basis. This
view is by far the most liberal, raising accountants' liability
risk substantially.
A fifth possible view has recently come forth. The fraud on
the market theory would expand CPAs' liability to individuals who
never saw the audit reports (i.e., persons who relied on
investment publications based on audit reports). To date, no
court has upheld this standard. The unlimited liability of the
fraud on the market theory is what Judge Cardozo, in Ultramares
v. Touche, Niven & Co. feared in 1931. Cardozo felt "that
accountants could not be held liable to third parties for
. negligence because it might 'expose accountants to a liability in
I
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an indeterminate amount for an indeterminate time to an
indeterminate class'" (Minow: 76).
Although common-law liability is broadening, there is some
statutory relief available for accountants. Because of the
different common law views, some states have enacted legislation
to clarify their position on CPAs' liability to third parties.
Illinois, in 1986, enacted a statute to regulate CPA liability to
third parties.
Liability may be imposed only if one of the following tests
is satisfied: (1) privity of contract between CPA and
plaintiff; (2) fraud or intentional misrepresentation; or
(3) the CPA was aware that the primary intent of the client
was to obtain the CPA's services to benefit or influence the
particular person bringing action (Miller, GAAS: 112.10).
Accountants prefer this view to other mo~e relaxed views because
r it severely limits third parties' ability to recover from
negligent auditors.
Impact On The Accounting Profession
Accountants have watched, with growing fear, their liability
risks increase over the past two decades. The number of lawsuits
filed, the amount of jury awards, and settlements against
accountants have increased. "According to available data (in
1987), the largest accounting firms collectively have paid more
than $250 million in settlements of mostly audit-related lawsuits
since 1980" (Mednick: 119). Since then, large pay-outs from big
cases have been highly publicized. For example, "Coopers agreed
to pay $95 million to settle claims related to the firm's
10
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allegedly faulty audits for a former client, the now-defunct
MiniScribe Corp" (C & L, Wall Street Journal). "In 1991, total
(direct) expenditures for settling and defending lawsuits were
$477 million -- nine percent of auditing and accounting revenues
in the United States" (Arthur Andersen: 2). Furthermore, in
November of 1992 "Ernst & Young agreed to pay the government $400
million to settle claims that its audits of hundreds of thrifts
had been inadequate" (Holland: 76).
Because of the large liability risk, insurance rates have
risen dramatically. "Insurance premiums for the largest CPA
firms have multiplied by a factor of five since 1984; at the same
time available commercial coverage has been cut in half. And
deductibles have increased many times over" (Mednick: 119). The
(~ following quote demonstrates the impact of increasing liability
on accountants' insurance rates.
The AICPA liability insurance plan's 1980 premium for firms
with 25 professionals was about $64 a person for $1 million
in coverage. By 1986 the premium had risen to about $1,160
a person -- and the deductible had doubled (Mednick: 119).
Many small firms have been forced to drop their insurance
coverage. In fact, "one out of five firms responding to a recent
Wisconsin Institute of CPAs survey of its members indicated that
it had been forced to drop its professional insurance coverage"
(Mednick: 119). "Claims against firms other than the six largest
-
rose by two-thirds between 1987 and 1991" (Arthur Andersen: 3).
I
Consequently, many smaller firms no longer provide auditing
11
~r
services because of high exposure risks and unaffordable
insurance.
Larger public accounting firms have also suffered. Many
have experienced a decrease in profit margin. Lower audit fees
resulting from increased competition for clients, together with
increasing insurance costs and legal fees, have diminished
profits. "Mr Freedman, Chairman of Coopers & Lybrand, said that
a reserve the firm set aside each year for liability insurance,
legal fees and settlements of lawsuits was increased by about ten
percent in fiscal 1992 because of litigation costs" (C & L, Wall
Street Journal). Fear of bankruptcy from excessive damage
awards, as happened with Laventhol and Horwath, is an increasing
concern. Partners could be held personally liable to satisfy
r-' claims. Additionally, the threat of personal liability has had a
negative effect on the recruitment of outstanding candidates into
the profession and those in the profession seeking partnership
positions.
Statement of Position
The aforementioned affects of litigation on the public
accounting profession has prompted the six largest accounting
firms to join together and draft a Statement of Position
concerning the liability crisis. The "Big Six" state:
-
It (the tort liability system) is no longer a balanced
system that provides reasonable compensation to victims by
responsible parties. Instead, it functions primarily as a
risk transfer scheme in which marginally culpable or even
innocent defendants too often must agree to coercedI
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settlements in order to avoid the threat of even higher
liability, pay judgments totally out of proportion to their
degree of fault, and incur substantial legal expenses to
defend against unwarranted lawsuits (Arthur Andersen: 1)
Often when a public company goes bankrupt the auditor is
named in a suit filed by stockholder or creditors. Accountants
believe "the motivation behind such suits seems to be the belief
that no risk is to be born as simply bad luck or fate, but that
all loss should be compensable by someone" (Minow: 72). Newton
Minow continues by stating,
there is no justification for shifting the normal risks of
investment from the investor to the accountant or, through
accountants' liability insurance, to all investors or the
public generally. The function of accounting is to provide
information to those in the market who place capital at risk
not to guarantee all such risks" (Minow: 79).
(
It appears as though accountants are being held responsible for
business failures, not audit failures. Lawrence A. Weinbach, CEO
of Arthur Andersen & Co. says "liability risk has gone so far,
it's not worth the risk to audit some small companies, real
estate ventures, financial services companies, initial public
offerings, and small banks; the risk-reward tradeoff is out of
whack" (Holland: 76).
High Risk Audits
Liability risk has made some audits impractical from a
business standpoint. As a consequence, some companies might find
-
I
it difficult to find a "Big Six" accounting firm willing to audit
their books. Likewise, companies offering potential positive
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contributions to society may never emerge, because they can not
find an auditor for their initial public offering.
With growing regularity, major public accounting firms are
turning their backs on many smaller banks, thrifts, and
fledgling companies. Deloitte & Touche, for one, declined
to audit about 60 companies trying to go public last year,
more than half the 103 initial public offerings they
actually evaluated (Holland: 76).
Since June of 1992, all audits of initial public offerings (IPOs)
at Deloitte & Touche must be approved by the head office.
Audits of banks are also risky, due to of increasing
regulatory requirements. Many banks in good financial condition
are having trouble keeping their auditors or finding new ones.
For example, Daniel Cargile, president and CEO of Tehama County
Bank, in Red Bluff, CA stated "The bank was doing fine and had
lots of excess capital... .Ernst & Young didn't want to audit the
bank anymore" (Holland: 76). When companies in good financial
condition have trouble finding an auditor, society loses. Reform
is needed.
Solutions
Many band-aid solutions to the liability crisis have been
proposed over the years. Some proposed solutions favor
accountants and others favor third-parties. Finding the fair
solutions is difficult. Accountants want to eliminate joint and
several liability, and would like a cap placed on punitive
-
I
damages. Third-parties want to retain the joint and several
--
r '
liability concept so they can sue the accountant to recover
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damages, when a co-defendant is bankrupt. The situation is fast
reaching a crisis point. Accounting firms fearing bankruptcy,
from possible liability claims, are beginning to turn away
credible clients. Some compromise must be reached before the
situation becomes intolerable.
It is clear that the audit function serves a purpose to
society. Even dissenting Judge J. Kennard in Bily v. Arthur
Young & Co. states,
Lenders and investors use the reports prepared by
independent auditors so widely, and rely on them so heavily,
that it is difficult to conceive how our complex modern
capital markets would function if they were no longer
available or no longer able to inspire confidence (Bily v.
Arthur) .
Some basic reforms are needed. To start, the legal system
needs reform. Howard Stone believes defendants should "be able
to point to falsities in complaints and thereby be allowed to
have a complaint dismissed. At the present time the judicial
system allows a complaint to be accepted as true.. .the defendant
cannot argue against the truthfulness of the complaint."
A compromise in joint and several liability is needed.
Currently, some states including Illinois have limited the
accountants' liability to their degree of fault if the degree of
fault is less than 20 percent.
The recovery of punitive damages also should be limited.
However, Professor Harry Wright believes punitive damages should
-
I
not have a cap. Rather, the plaintiffs should not receive the
award. Any punitive damages awarded would instead be deposited
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into a fund. The fund could be used to pay plaintiffs who can
not recover because of bankrupt defendants, for SEC investigative
costs, or to reduce the federal deficit. This proposed reform
would resolve much of the debate surrounding punitive damages.
The threat of large punitive damages remains to discourage
unlawful acts, but the windfall for plaintiffs is no longer
present.
Third-party liability needs to be defined in the form of
legislation. Negligent auditors should be held liable to parties
who relied on the audit reports. Legitimate plaintiffs should be
able to bring a suit against an auditor even if the auditor was
not "linked to the plaintiff." However, auditors should not be
liable for an unlimited amount. Perhaps a per share limit or a
~- per transaction limit could help auditors better assess the risk-
reward trade-off of auditing a client and to help set fees.
Accountants' liability to third parties is clearly a
complicated situation and any reform will be met with resistance
from the group "giving up" something. Education for accountants,
judges, lawyers, and the investing public is fundamental to the







Accountants' Legal Liability Questionnaire
Background Information
The accounting profession's view of the liability crisis in
America is presented and discussed at great length in the
classroom. My objective is to present a different perspective of
this issue. The purpose of this interview is to gather your




1. Briefly describe your professional exposure to, or
involvement with, accountants' legal liability?
r-, Expectation Gap
Significant differences exist between the expectatiQns of users
of audited financial statements and the level of responsibility
independent auditors are willing to assume. This situation is
generally referred to as the "Expectation Gap."








3. Do you believe third parties expect too much from a
financial statement auditor? Explain.
4. In your opinion, what caused this expectation gap?
5. Given that auditors are hired and paid by clients, do you
believe they can adequately serve third party interests? If
no, how could this be corrected?
19
The Litigation Explosion in the United States
Professionals have been greatly affected by the litigation
explosion in the United States. Professionals argue that
unwarranted lawsuits are filed to recover out of court
settlements from innocent defendants. In many cases
professionals choose to settle rather than bear the burden of
legal defense costs. These so-called "professional plaintiffs"
are, in effect, clogging the courts and hindering the rights of
legitimate plaintiffs.
6. What can be done to educate the general public about the
ramifications of unwarranted litigation?
7. Should plaintiffs be required to pay a prevailing defendants
legal fees if the courts determine that the suit was
meritless?
('





The Public Accounting Profession's Statement of Position
The Big Six Accounting Firms issued A Statement of Position on
August 6, 1992 entitled "The Liability Crisis In the United
States: Impact On the Accounting Profession." One of the issues
addressed is the doctrine of joint and several liability. Joint
and several liability means that accountants are exposed to 100
percent of the damages even if found to be only one percent at
fault. One potential consequence of this doctrine is that
accounting firms will no longer audit high-risk companies and/or
industries. The Big Six firms want to replace joint and several
liability with proportionate liability. They argue that this
would reduce their exposure, while still protecting the public
against fraudulent audits.
9. What is your opinion of joint and several liability for
public accountants?
10. Do you believe every company, regardless of the risk to the
auditor, deserves a financial statement audit?
11. Will society be harmed if high risk companies and/or




Bily v. Arthur Young & Co. Decision
A recently California Supreme Court decision (Bily v. Arthur
Young & Co.) supported the opinion that an auditor owes no
general duty of care regarding the conduct of an audit to persons
other than the client. However, the auditor is liable for
negligent misrepresentations in an audit report to those persons
who rely upon those misrepresentations in a transaction which the
auditor intended to influence. A dissenting judge believes the
ruling gives negligent accountants broad immunity for their
professional malpractice in rendering audit opinions.
12. What impact do you expect this court decision to have on
future cases involving accountants' liability to third
party users of audited financial statement?
('
Conclusion and Summary
The following questions will be used to summarize your thoughts
and opinions about the liability crisis facing the public
accounting profession.
13. Does the liability system in the United States require




14. What actions should public accounting firms take to protect
themselves from the litigation onslaught?
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